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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a general analysis of the e⁄ects of monopolistic third-
degree price discrimination on welfare and output when all markets are
served. Su¢ cient conditions ￿involving straightforward comparisons of the
curvatures of the direct and inverse demand functions in the di⁄erent mar-
kets ￿are presented for discrimination to have negative or positive e⁄ects on
social welfare and output.
Keywords: Third-Degree Price Discrimination, Output, Monopoly, Wel-
fare.
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1 Introduction
This paper develops general conditions that determine whether third-degree
price discrimination by a monopolist serving all markets reduces or raises
output and social welfare, de￿ned as the sum of consumer surplus and pro￿t.
A ￿rm practising third-degree price discrimination uses an exogenous charac-
teristic, such as the age or location of the consumer or the time of purchase, to
divide customers into separate markets. The monopoly price can then be set
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1in each market if discrimination is allowed. Moving from non-discrimination
to discrimination raises the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts, harms consumers in markets where
prices increase and bene￿ts the consumers who face lower prices. The overall
e⁄ect on welfare can be positive or negative. The main aim of this paper
is to provide conditions based on the shapes of the demand functions to de-
termine the sign of the welfare e⁄ect. We also address the classic question
of the e⁄ect of discrimination on total output, and the paper combines new
￿ndings with existing results in a uni￿ed framework.
The e⁄ect of discrimination on welfare can be divided into a misalloca-
tion e⁄ect and an output e⁄ect. With discrimination output is ine¢ ciently
distributed because consumers face di⁄erent prices in di⁄erent markets. This
negative feature of discrimination may, however, be o⁄set if there is an in-
crease in total output, which is socially valuable since prices exceed marginal
costs. Arthur Pigou (1920) proved that if all demand functions are linear
and all markets are served at the non-discriminatory price then total output
remains at the no-discrimination level, in which case discrimination is bad
for welfare. Joan Robinson￿ s (1933) pioneering analysis, taken forward by
Richard Schmalensee (1981), showed how the curvature of demands deter-
mines the sign of output e⁄ect. Hal Varian (1985) proved very generally
that a necessary condition for welfare to rise with discrimination is that total
output increases (see also Marius Schwartz, 1990).
In this paper we explore the welfare e⁄ect directly using the technique
developed by Schmalensee (1981) and Thomas Holmes (1989) to analyze the
output e⁄ect.1 Throughout it is assumed that at the non-discriminatory
price all markets are served with positive quantities, so price discrimination
does not open up new markets.2 To simplify the exposition, but without loss
of generality, we explore the case with two markets. The ￿rm is supposed
initially to be required to set the same price in both markets ￿i.e. the price
di⁄erence is constrained to be zero. As this constraint is relaxed, the ￿rm
moves towards the laissez-faire outcome with price discrimination. As this
happens, output and welfare will increase in what Joan Robinson (1933)
termed the ￿ weak￿market, where the discriminatory price is below the non-
discriminatory price, and decrease in the ￿ strong￿market. The question is
how overall welfare and total output vary as the price-di⁄erence constraint
1Earlier applications of the method are by Wassily Leontief (1940) and Eugene Silber-
berg (1970).
2See Jerry Hausman and Je⁄rey Mackie-Mason, 1988, Stephen Layson, 1994, and Victor
Kaftal and Debashi Pal, 2008, for analyses of price discrimination that opens new markets.
2is relaxed.
Central to our analysis is a (commonly met) condition on demand func-
tions ￿the increasing ratio condition ￿which ensures that welfare varies
monotonically with the price-di⁄erence constraint, or else has a single in-
terior peak. Given the increasing ratio condition, discrimination is shown
to reduce welfare if the direct demand function in the strong market is at
least as convex as that in the weak market at the non-discriminatory price.
Second, welfare is higher with discrimination if the discriminatory prices are
not far apart and the inverse demand function in the weak market is locally
more convex than that in the strong market: total output then rises while
the misallocation e⁄ect is relatively small. Outside these cases, welfare ￿rst
rises but then falls as the price-di⁄erence constraint is relaxed, so an inter-
mediate degree of discrimination would be optimal, and the overall e⁄ect on
welfare of unfettered discrimination can be positive or negative. Its sign can
however be determined in important special cases: (i) when inverse demand
curvature is constant, welfare falls with discrimination if curvature is su¢ -
ciently below unity and rises if curvature is su¢ ciently above unity, and (ii)
when demands have constant elasticities, although total output rises with
discrimination (Iæaki Aguirre, 2006), welfare falls if the di⁄erence between
the elasticities is no more than one. In parallel to the welfare analysis, we
also obtain new results on how discrimination a⁄ects total output, which
rises if both inverse and direct demand in the weak market are more convex
than those functions in the strong market, but not if both inverse and direct
demand in the strong market are at least as convex as those in the weak
market.3
The broad economic intuition for why the di⁄erence between the curva-
tures of demand in weak and strong markets is important for welfare and
output is as follows. A price increase when demand is concave has relatively
little e⁄ect on welfare (the extreme form of concavity is when the demand
function is rectangular and there is no deadweight loss from monopoly pric-
ing). If at the same time price falls in a market with relatively convex de-
mand, there is a large increase in output and thus in welfare in that market.
This is the insight of Robinson (1933), who showed that total output rises
when discrimination causes prices to rise in markets with concave demands
3These output results build on, and encompass, those of Robinson (1933), Schmalensee
(1981), Jun-ji Shih, Chao-cheng Mai and Jung-chao Liu (1988) and Francis Cheung and
Xinghe Wang (1994).
3and prices to fall in markets with convex demands, and David Malueg (1994)
explored further the relationship between the curvature of the demand func-
tion and the deadweight loss from monopoly pricing.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of
monopoly pricing with and without third-degree price discrimination. Sec-
tion 3 contains the welfare analysis using the price-di⁄erence technique. The
e⁄ect of discrimination on total output is considered in Section 4. Section
5 presents the results of the welfare analysis using a restriction on how far
quantities can vary from their non-discriminatory levels, and considers the
important special case where demands have constant elasticities. Conclusions
are in Section 6.
2 The Model of Monopoly Pricing
A monopolist sells its product in two markets and has a constant marginal
cost, c ￿ 0. The assumption of two markets is made for simplicity ￿all
the results can be generalized to the case of more than two markets and
the method for doing this is discussed later. Utility functions are quasi-
linear. Demand in a representative market with price p is q(p), which is
twice-di⁄erentiable, decreasing and independent of the price in the other
market. (To avoid notational clutter we omit subscripts where it is not
necessary to indicate which market is which.) The price elasticity of demand
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so the expression in square brackets is positive and the pro￿t function is
strictly concave.5 With strict concavity the second-order conditions hold
for the maximization problems that follow. De￿ne ￿(p) ￿ ￿pq00=q0 as the
convexity (or curvature) of direct demand, which is analogous to relative risk
aversion for a utility function and is the elasticity of the slope of demand. The
4See Glen Weyl and Michal Fabinger (2009) for a general analysis of demand curvature
and social welfare with imperfect competition.
5Part 1 of the Appendix discusses conditions that ensure strict concavity. See Babu
Nahata, Krzysztof Ostaszewski and Prasanna K. Sahoo (1990) for an analysis of price
discrimination when pro￿t functions are not concave in prices.
4Lerner index, the mark-up of price over marginal cost, is L(p) ￿ (p￿c)=p and
2+(p￿c)q00=q0 = 2￿L￿ > 0 by strict concavity. Similarly the curvature or
convexity of the inverse demand function p(q) is ￿(q) ￿ ￿qp00=p0 = qq00=[q0]2.
The two curvature measures are related to the price elasticity by ￿ = ￿=￿.
The values of ￿ and of ￿ play key roles in the analysis.









where p￿ > c is the pro￿t-maximizing price and the star denotes the value
that applies with full discrimination. From the ￿rst-order condition comes the
Lerner condition for monopoly pricing L￿ = 1=￿￿. Thus L￿￿￿ = ￿￿=￿￿ = ￿￿
and, with strict concavity, 2￿L￿￿￿ = 2￿￿￿ > 0. The subscript w denotes the
weak market, where the discriminatory price is below the non-discriminatory
one (see below), and subscript s denotes the strong market, where the price
is higher with discrimination. The classi￿cation of a market as strong or
weak is endogenous. It is assumed that both markets are served at the non-
discriminatory price ￿a su¢ cient condition for this is that qw(p￿
s) > 0.
When the ￿rm cannot discriminate it chooses the single price p that
maximizes aggregate pro￿t, which is de￿ned by the ￿rst-order condition
￿0
w(p) + ￿0
s(p) = 0. The ￿rst-order condition and the assumption that
both markets are served at the non-discriminatory price imply that ￿0
w(p) =
qw(p)[1 ￿ L(p)￿w(p)] < 0 and ￿0
s(p) = qs(p)[1 ￿ L(p)￿s(p)] > 0, so ￿w(p) >
￿s(p). The weak market has the higher elasticity at the non-discriminatory
(or uniform) price. With strict concavity of each pro￿t function it follows
that p￿
s > p > p￿
w: Social welfare W is the sum of consumer surplus and pro-
ducer surplus (or gross utility minus cost) so the marginal e⁄ect of price on
social welfare in a market is dW
dp = (p￿c)q0(p), i.e. the e⁄ect on the quantity
multiplied by the price-cost margin.
3 The E⁄ect of Discrimination on Welfare
The method used by Schmalensee (1981), Holmes (1989) and Lars Stole
(2007) to consider the output e⁄ect is adopted here to analyze the welfare
e⁄ect. In the following section we use it to re-examine the output e⁄ect.
Initially the ￿rm is not allowed (or is unable) to discriminate and thus sets
the uniform price p. Then the constraint on the ￿rm￿ s freedom to discrimi-
nate is gradually relaxed until the ￿rm can discriminate as much as it likes.
5Our approach is to calculate the marginal e⁄ect on welfare of relaxing the
constraint; if this keeps the same sign as more discrimination is allowed, then
the overall e⁄ect of discrimination can be found.
In particular, we assume that the ￿rm chooses its prices to maximize
pro￿t subject to the constraint that ps ￿pw ￿ r where r ￿ 0 is the degree of
discrimination allowed. The objective function is ￿w(pw)+￿s(pw+r) and the
￿rst-order condition is ￿0
w(pw) + ￿0
s(pw + r) = 0 when the constraint binds.
When r = 0 the ￿rm sets the non-discriminatory price. As r rises more



















When the constraint does not bind the ￿rm sets the discriminatory prices.
The marginal change in social welfare W as more price discrimination is
allowed is
(2) W









A relaxation of the constraint alters prices and thus the quantities demanded,
and each additional unit of output has social value equal to the price-cost
margin in that market. For r > r￿ = p￿
s ￿ p￿
w the marginal welfare e⁄ect
is zero because the prices remain at the discriminatory levels. De￿ne W 0(0)
and W 0(r￿) as right- and left-derivatives respectively. The marginal e⁄ect




s so, following Schmalensee (1981), (2)
may be written as:
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(Value of) output e⁄ect
The ￿rst two terms equal zero at r = 0 and are negative for r > 0. Together
they represent the marginal misallocation e⁄ect. The ￿nal term is the value
of the change in output. At the non-discriminatory price, because there
is no misallocation e⁄ect, the marginal welfare e⁄ect is proportional to the
marginal change in aggregate output. Integrating (3) over [0;r￿] gives the
total welfare e⁄ect as two negative terms (the total misallocation e⁄ect) plus
6(p￿c) times the total output change. This con￿rms that an output increase
is necessary for social welfare to rise.6
In our analysis a crucial role is played by
(4) z(p) ￿
(p ￿ c)q0(p)




the ratio of the marginal e⁄ect of a price increase on social welfare to the
second derivative of the pro￿t function. Substituting the comparative statics














The marginal welfare e⁄ect thus has the same sign as [zw(pw(r)) ￿ zs(ps(r))].
The following assumption is made for the three propositions in this section.
The increasing ratio condition (IRC): z(p) is increasing in p in each
market.
This holds for a very large set of demand functions. These include:
functions that are linear; inverse demands with constant positive curvature,
including the exponential and constant-elasticity functions; direct demand
functions with constant curvature (whether positive or negative); probits
and logits (derived from the normal and logistic distributions respectively);
and demand functions derived from the lognormal distribution. Part 2 of the
Appendix presents su¢ cient conditions for the condition to hold and gives a
fuller list of the demand functions to which it applies. While the increasing
ratio condition holds very commonly ￿and always it holds locally in the
region around marginal cost ￿it is not universally applicable. For example
when inverse demand has constant negative curvature the condition does not
hold for high enough prices and di⁄erent techniques are necessary to deal
with this case.
6It should be noted that the decomposition of the total welfare e⁄ect into an output
e⁄ect and a misallocation e⁄ect is not unique. See Aguirre (2008) for a graphical analysis
based on a di⁄erent decomposition.
































which is negative if W 0 = 0 because z0
wp0
w < 0 and z0
sp0
s > 0, and zw = zs
where W 0 = 0.
The IRC therefore implies that W(r) is strictly quasi-concave, and thus is
monotonic in r or has a single interior peak. Only three outcomes are possi-
ble: either welfare, as a function of r, is everywhere decreasing, or everywhere
increasing, or it ￿rst rises then falls. Which holds depends on the signs of
W 0(0) and W 0(r￿). First, if W 0(0) ￿ 0, then W(r) is decreasing for r > 0
and discrimination therefore reduces welfare.
Proposition 1 Given the IRC, if the direct demand function in the
strong market is at least as convex as that in the weak market at the non-
discriminatory price then discrimination reduces welfare.
Proof. The Lemma implies that discrimination reduces welfare if W 0(0) ￿
0. At the non-discriminatory price, where r = 0, pw￿c = ps￿c and Lw = Ls.
So from (5), [zw(p)￿zs(p)] and hence W 0(0) have the sign of [￿w(p)￿￿s(p)],
the di⁄erence in curvatures of direct demand, which is non-positive under
the condition stated in the proposition.
The condition on the di⁄erence in the demand curvatures implies that
locally output does not increase, and since at the non-discriminatory price the
marginal misallocation e⁄ect is zero a local output e⁄ect that is negative or
zero implies that the welfare e⁄ect has the same sign. The IRC then extends
this local result to all additional increases in the amount of discrimination,
and thus acts as a sign-preserver.
Proposition 1 encompasses the results of Simon Cowan (2007), who has
demand in the strong market being an a¢ ne transformation of demand in
the weak market, i.e. qs(p) = M +Nqw(p) where M and N are positive (and
demand in both markets is zero at a su¢ ciently high price). At the same
price the direct demand functions, by construction, have the same curvature.
8This is analogous to the result in expected utility theory that the coe¢ cients
of absolute and relative risk aversion, at a given income level, are invariant
to positive a¢ ne transformations of the utility function. An example is when
the direct demand functions have constant and common curvature, ￿, and a
special case is when both demand functions are linear (￿ = 0). Proposition
1 is more general because it allows the demand functions to have di⁄erent
parameters or di⁄erent functional forms, as in the following example.
Example 1: exponential and linear demands. Demand in market 1 is
q1(p) = Be￿p=b (with B and b positive), so ￿1 = 1; ￿1 = ￿1 = p=b > 0 and
p￿
1 = b + c. Demand in market 2 is q2(p) = a ￿ p so ￿2(p) = p=(a ￿ p);
￿2 = ￿2 = 0 and p￿
2 = (a + c)=2. Proposition 1 applies if b > (a ￿ c)=2,
which is the condition for market 1 to be the strong one. The weak market
is served with non-discriminatory pricing if (but not only if) a > b + c.
If discrimination is to raise welfare, given the IRC, direct demand in
the weak market must be strictly more convex than demand in the strong
market at the non-discriminatory price. Only then does a small amount
of discrimination causes total output to rise. This is a local version of the
condition that for welfare to rise total output must increase.
Figure 1 shows, in a standard monopoly diagram, that as demand in the
weak market becomes more convex the welfare gain in this market from dis-
crimination rises. Initially inverse demand is the linear function p1(q) and
its associated marginal revenue curve is MR1(q) = p1(q) + qp0
1(q). The non-
discriminatory quantity is q and the discriminatory quantity is q1. Suppose
that demand becomes more convex, while retaining the same slope and po-
sition at the non-discriminatory price (which thus will be unchanged). The
new inverse demand is p2(q). At q the marginal revenues intersect (because
the price, demand slope and quantity are the same).7 For q > q, however,
MR2(q) > MR1(q) because the price is higher and a given output increase
causes a smaller price reduction. Thus discriminatory output, q2, is higher
with the new demand than with the old demand function. The change in
welfare in this market when discrimination occurs is then larger with the
transformed function for two reasons: the output increase is greater, and
7See Jeremy Bulow and Paul P￿ eiderer (1983) for a discussion of the relationship
between the marginal revenue curves associated with demand curves that have a point of
tangency, and also Malueg (1994).
9at every quantity above q the price, and thus the marginal social value of
output, is higher. Discrimination is more likely to raise welfare overall when
demand in the weak market becomes more convex.
We now present a su¢ cient condition for welfare to be higher with dis-
crimination than without. This is found by examining what happens at the
discriminatory prices.








s (so inverse demand
in the weak market is more convex than that in the strong market at the
discriminatory prices, which are close together) then welfare is higher with
discrimination.
Proof. The Lemma implies that discrimination increases welfare if W 0(r￿) ￿
0. From (5) and the fact that L￿￿￿ = ￿￿=￿￿ = ￿￿ the left-derivative of W(r)
















which is non-negative under the stated condition.
The condition in Proposition 2 ensures that the price di⁄erence with
full discrimination is small enough that the bene￿t to welfare from the out-
put increase exceeds the misallocation e⁄ect, and this holds for all marginal
increases in discrimination. The proposition may be useful if discrimina-
tion is currently practised and a ban on discrimination is being considered.
More generally it characterizes conditions for discriminatory welfare to be
higher in a way that is both intuitive and straightforward to apply. We use
the demand functions of Example 1 to illustrate. Proposition 2 applies if
(a ￿ c)=2 > b ￿ (a ￿ c)=4. The ￿rst inequality states that the discrimina-
tory margin in the exponential market, b, is below that in the linear market,
so the exponential market is now the weak one. The second inequality is
the condition for W 0(r￿) ￿ 0. The multiplicative market-size parameter, B,
in the exponential demand function determines the non-discriminatory price
but does not a⁄ect the discriminatory prices. Since Proposition 2 depends
only on the discriminatory prices it is independent of such multiplicative
market-size parameters.
The marginal e⁄ect on the discriminatory price of a small change in mar-
10ginal cost is 1=(2￿￿￿), i.e. the pass-through rate.8 This suggests a potential
empirical strategy for determining whether the condition in Proposition 2
holds when the ￿rm initially discriminates. A regression of the monopoly
price on marginal cost yields a slope coe¢ cient which is the estimate of
1=(2 ￿ ￿￿). The demand function itself does not need to be estimated in
this reduced-form approach. Alternatively it may be feasible to estimate the
demand functions directly. David Genesove and Wallace Mullin (1998) esti-
mate four inverse demand functions with constant curvature in their analysis
of oligopoly in the sugar industry.
The next proposition gives conditions for welfare to rise initially, and then
to fall, as discrimination increases.
Proposition 3. Given the IRC, if (i) direct demand in the weak market
is more convex than demand in the strong market at the non-discriminatory
price, and (ii) inverse demand in the strong market is at least as convex
as that in the weak market at the discriminatory prices, then welfare rises
initially as the degree of discrimination increases, and then falls.
Proof. Condition (i), which is the opposite of the condition in Proposition
1, implies W 0(0) > 0. Condition (ii), which negates the condition in Propo-
sition 2, implies W 0(r￿) < 0. From the Lemma, there is a unique b r 2 (0;r￿)
at which W 0(b r) = 0. For r < b r we have W 0(r) > 0, while W 0(r) < 0 for r > b r.
Under the conditions of Proposition 3, some discrimination is better than
none, but laissez-faire leads to too much. Of course it would be di¢ cult in
practice to identify the ￿ optimal￿amount of discrimination at which welfare
reaches its peak. Proposition 3 does not determine whether the e⁄ect on
welfare of full discrimination is positive or negative. We show in section 5 how
other techniques can resolve this question for two applications of Proposition
3. The ￿rst is where ￿ is strictly positive and the same in the two markets,
so condition (ii) holds (weakly), as does condition (i) because ￿ = ￿￿ and
the elasticity is higher in the weak market at the non-discriminatory price.
The second case is that of constant-elasticity demand functions, with ￿w and
￿s being the constant elasticities in the weak and strong markets respectively
8Weyl and Fabinger (2009) show, among other results, how the division of the surplus
between a monopolist and consumers depends on the cost pass-through rate, which in turn
depends on inverse demand curvature.
11(so ￿w > ￿s). The generic constant-elasticity demand function is q = Ap￿￿
for A > 0. The curvature of direct demand is ￿ = 1 + ￿, which is higher in
the weak market so condition (i) holds, and the curvature of inverse demand
is ￿ = 1 + 1=￿, which is higher in the strong market so (ii) also holds.
The results in this section can be generalized to the case of more than
two markets using the technique of Schmalensee (1981). The ￿rm chooses its
prices subject to a constraint on the weighted sum of the di⁄erences between
the prices and the uniform price, with the weight on each price di⁄erence
being marginal pro￿tability at the uniform price, ￿0(p). With two markets the
weights are of equal size and opposite sign (by the ￿rst-order condition for the
non-discrimination problem), so the technique is the same as constraining the
price di⁄erence, as above. The propositions generalize naturally. For example
Proposition 1 becomes ￿If the direct demand functions in the strong markets
are at least as convex as those in the weak markets at the non-discriminatory
price then discrimination reduces welfare￿ .
4 The E⁄ect of Discrimination on Output
The same method is now used to determine the output e⁄ect. In doing this
we use the approach of Holmes (1989), which follows Schmalensee (1981),
but the analysis is taken further. The increasing ratio condition is no longer
necessary. Total output, as a function of the allowed amount of discrimina-
tion, is Q(r) = qw(pw(r))+qs(ps(r)). Using the comparative statics formulae














which has the sign of
(7) Lw￿w ￿ Ls￿s = Lw￿w(￿w ￿ ￿s) + (Lw￿w ￿ Ls￿s)￿s:
At the non-discriminatory price, Q0(0)
sgn
= ￿w(p)￿￿s(p). With discriminatory





From the LHS of (7) and the fact that Lw ￿ Ls, it is evident that
discrimination increases output if, throughout the relevant range of prices,
12￿w ￿ 0 ￿ ￿s (strictly if one inequality is strict), or if 0 ￿ ￿w ￿ ￿s. Output
decreases if ￿s ￿ 0 ￿ ￿w or ￿s ￿ ￿w ￿ 0: Further, the mild assumption that
d
dp(L￿) > 0, which holds very generally (see Appendix, part 2), implies that
Lw￿w > Ls￿s for r < r￿. We can then see from the RHS of (7) that discrimi-
nation increases output if ￿w ￿ ￿s ￿ 0, and decreases output if ￿w ￿ ￿s ￿ 0:
Summarizing these observations the following result encompasses much of
the literature on the e⁄ect of discrimination on output that has developed
from the analysis of Robinson (1933).
Proposition 4 (i) If demand is concave in the strong market and less
concave, or convex, in the weak market then output increases with discrim-
ination. (ii) If demand is convex in the strong market and concave, or less
convex, in the weak market then output decreases with discrimination. (iii)
If inverse demands are convex, and more so in the weak market, then output
increases with discrimination, while (iv) if inverse demands are concave, and
more so in the weak market, output falls with discrimination.
Pigou￿ s 1920 result for linear demands, that output does not change,
is on the boundary between all four cases, so ￿ts all interpreted weakly.
Robinson￿ s (1933) result that output does not rise if demand in the weak
market is concave and demand in the strong market is convex is an instance
of (ii); she derived a parallel condition for output to rise that is within (i).
Cheung and Wang (1994), generalizing Shih, Mai and Liu (1988), show that
output increases if ￿w ￿ ￿s > 0, as in (iii), and falls if ￿w ￿ ￿s < 0, as in
(iv). Cowan (2007) has ￿w = ￿s so this is an example of (i) if ￿ < 0 and of
(ii) if ￿ > 0.
The four results in Proposition 4 are usefully summarized in the two
following statements. If both direct demand and inverse demand are more
convex in the weak market than in the strong market, so (i) or (iii) holds,
total output rises. If both direct demand and inverse demand are more (or
equally) convex in the strong market than in the weak market, so (ii) or (iv)
applies, total output does not increase. Thus Robinson (1933) was almost
right when she stated that for third-degree price discrimination to increase
total output the demand in the weak market should be "in some sense" (p.
193) more convex than the demand in the strong market.
In cases of Proposition 4 where output does not rise with discrimination,
welfare falls. The next question is whether we can ￿nd conditions, beyond
13those of Proposition 2, for welfare to increase. For example when ￿w = ￿s > 0
and is constant Proposition 3 holds and the welfare e⁄ect is ambiguous, but
output certainly rises. The critical value of ￿ in this case turns out to be 1.
To show this we use another analytical approach.
5 Constant Curvature of Inverse Demand
Further insight into the welfare e⁄ects of discrimination can be gained using
two additional techniques that are useful when inverse demand curvature
is constant. The ￿rst is a quantity-restriction technique that is analogous
to the price-restriction method of sections 3 and 4. Let qi ￿ qi(p) be the
quantity sold in market i when the uniform price is charged, and de￿ne
￿i(qi) = ￿i(pi(qi)) as pro￿t as a function of quantity. To ensure concavity
of the pro￿t function assume that marginal revenue is declining in output in
each market, which holds when ￿ < 2. Consider the problem of maximizing




w(qw)(qw ￿ qw) ￿ ￿p
0
s(qs)(qs ￿ qs) + t:












When t = 0 the ￿rm chooses the quantities that are sold at the uniform
price p. As t rises the ￿rm increases the quantity in the weak market and
cuts supply to the strong market so prices move towards their discriminatory
levels. From (8) it follows that, as more quantity variation is allowed, W 0(t)




















Note that ￿(0) simply has the sign of ￿w ￿ ￿s evaluated at the quantities at
price p. To sign the marginal welfare e⁄ect for t > 0 we assume that the
curvatures of inverse demand ￿i are constant in each market.
14Proposition 5. With constant curvature of inverse demand: (i) If 1 > ￿s
￿ ￿w and L(p)￿w(p)￿w ￿ 1, discrimination reduces welfare. (ii) If ￿w ￿
￿s > 1 and L(p)￿s(p)￿s ￿ 1, discrimination raises welfare.
Proof. See Appendix, part 3.
The condition in part (i) of the proposition that inverse demand in the
strong market is at least as convex as in the weak market implies that
W 0(0) ￿ 0. The other condition implies that W 0(t) is decreasing and so
preserves the sign of W 0(t): If the discriminatory prices are not far apart,
then L￿ ￿ 1, in which case the second condition in (i) follows from the ￿rst.
Likewise for part (ii) of the proposition.
Proposition 5 goes beyond Propositions 3 and 4 when both demands are
strictly convex. For example, when ￿w = ￿s > 0; Proposition 3 applies and
Proposition 4(iii) tells us that output increases. Proposition 5 shows that,
if the discriminatory prices are not far apart, whether welfare falls or rises
depends on whether ￿ is below or above 1. If ￿ < 1 the misallocation e⁄ect
outweighs the positive output e⁄ect, while if ￿ > 1 the output e⁄ect is strong
enough to exceed the misallocation e⁄ect.
A special case of constant inverse demand curvature is when both de-
mand functions have constant elasticities. Proposition 3 applies, so welfare
￿rst rises and then falls as the price di⁄erence is increased, but none of the
other results so far presented yields a welfare or output conclusion (because
the weak market has higher curvature of direct demand but lower inverse de-
mand curvature). For this case Richard Ippolito (1980) conducts an extensive
numerical analysis, ￿nding in his examples that output always rises with dis-
crimination but welfare can fall or rise, depending on the di⁄erence in the
elasticities and the relative sizes of the markets.9 Aguirre (2006) proves that
total output rises with discrimination using an inequality due to Bernoulli.
Here we present a simpler proof of Aguirre￿ s output result, and go on to ￿nd












for i 2 fw;sg and for 0 ￿ m ￿ 1. Thus ￿i is a weighted harmonic mean
9See also Melvin Greenhut and Hiroshi Ohta (1976) and John Formby, Stephen Layson
and James Smith (1983).
15of the discriminatory and non-discriminatory prices, with weight m on the
former. As before we look for conditions that ensure monotonicity, here as m
goes from 0 (no discrimination) to 1 (full discrimination). Total output and
welfare are respectively convex and (under the stated condition) concave in
m, with zero derivatives at m = 0, allowing us to state:
Proposition 6. When demand functions have constant elasticities: (i)
total output is higher with discrimination, and (ii) social welfare is lower with
discrimination if the di⁄erence between the elasticities is at most 1.
Proof. See Appendix, part 4.
The condition in part (ii) of the proposition can be relaxed to the elas-
ticity di⁄erence not exceeding the reciprocal of the share of the weak market
in total output at the non-discriminatory price. (However, the condition can
fail when elasticities di⁄er substantially ￿as Ippolito￿ s (1980) examples illus-
trate ￿and welfare can increase with discrimination.) The welfare result is
somewhat puzzling: it is natural to think that when the elasticities are close
the discriminatory prices will be close and thus the misallocation e⁄ect will
be small. But so too is the output e⁄ect, and it is far from obvious intuitively
which is smaller. Proposition 6 provides a conditional answer.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides direct analysis of the classic problem of whether monop-
olistic third-degree price discrimination raises or reduces social welfare when
all markets are served. The conditions that determine the welfare e⁄ects de-
pend on simple curvature properties of demand functions. The main results
are that welfare is higher with discrimination when inverse demand in the
low-price market is more convex than that in the other market and the price
di⁄erence with discrimination is small, and discrimination reduces welfare
when the direct demand function is more convex in the high-price market.
We also present new analysis of how discrimination a⁄ects total output, and
provide a synthesis of existing results on welfare and output. It is well known
that the e⁄ect of price discrimination can be positive or negative for welfare,
and the paper provides conditions under which the sign of the welfare ef-
fect can be predicted. In many cases discrimination reduces welfare but our
16analysis has shown that the conditions for discrimination to raise welfare are
plausible.
Appendix
1. Concavity of the pro￿t function.
Concavity of the demand function implies that the pro￿t function is con-
cave in the price. When demand is strictly convex, however, restrictions on
the amount of convexity are required for the pro￿t function to be strictly con-
cave, i.e. for 2 ￿ L￿ > 0. One su¢ cient condition is that ￿ < 2 everywhere
since L ￿ 1. An alternative su¢ cient condition works when inverse demand
has constant positive curvature, which includes the special cases of constant-
elasticity and exponential demand functions. In this case if all prices are
below 2p￿ ￿ c the pro￿t function is strictly concave. To show this use the
generic inverse demand function with constant ￿, p = a ￿ bq1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) for
￿ 6= 1 or p = a￿bln(q) for ￿ = 1. It follows that p￿ = [(1￿￿)a+c]=(2￿￿)
when ￿ 6= 1 and p￿ = b + c when ￿ = 1. The second derivative of the pro￿t
function is negative if and only if 2p￿ ￿ c > p. This holds automatically in
the strong market but for the weak market it must be assumed. E⁄ectively
this is an assumption that the uniform price is not too far above the discrim-
inatory price in the weak market.
2. Su¢ cient conditions for the increasing ratio condition.
We may write z(p) as:
z(p) ￿
p ￿ c










Using the ￿rst version z(p) is seen to be increasing if the absolute curvature
of direct demand, ￿=p ￿ ￿q00=q0, is non-decreasing in p. This is equivalent
to the slope of demand, ￿q0(p), being log-concave, and existing results on
log-concave density functions in probability theory can be used, since the
slope of the demand function can be thought of as a density function (see
Andrew Caplin and Barry Nalebu⁄, 1991, Mark Bagnoli and Ted Bergstrom,
2005, and Simon Cowan, 2007). Many demand functions have log-concave
slopes including linear demand, probit demand (from a normal distribution),
demands derived from the extreme value and logistic distributions, demands
17with constant negative ￿, and functions with constant ￿ in [0;1], including ex-
ponential demand. From the second version z(p) is increasing if d
dp(L￿) > 0.
In turn there are two sets of su¢ cient conditions. First, if ￿ is non-decreasing
in p and is positive then d
dp(L￿) > 0. This is useful when the slope of demand
is not log-concave. Examples are: ￿ that is constant and positive, a special
case of which is the constant-elasticity demand curve with ￿ = 1+￿ (where
￿ > 1 is the elasticity); demands derived from the lognormal, F, Weibull
and Gamma distributions (when their slopes are log-convex), demand that
comes from the t distribution with two or more degrees of freedom (see
Cowan, 2007) and single-commodity AIDS demand (where q =
a+blog(p)
p for
b < 0). Second, use the fact that L￿ = L￿￿, which gives the third version
of z(p). If ￿ is positive and non-decreasing, and d
dp(L￿) > 0, then z(p) is







positive if (but not only if) ￿ ￿ 1. For constant ￿ > 1, with inverse demand
p = a￿bq1￿￿=(1￿￿), d
dp(L￿) > 0 if and only if c > a, which is necessary for
demand to be ￿nite and downward-sloping. The derivative of z(p) evaluated
at c is 0:5 for all demand functions, so z(p) cannot be everywhere decreasing.
When ￿ is constant and negative z(p) is increasing when prices are close to
marginal cost but is decreasing at high enough prices.
3. Proof of Proposition 5.

















If, over the relevant range of prices, (1 ￿ L￿￿) has the same sign in both
markets, then ￿
0(t) has the opposite sign to that because q0
w(t) > 0 > q0
s(t).
So if ￿w ￿ ￿s and L￿￿ ￿ 1 in both markets, then ￿(0) ￿ 0 and ￿
0 < 0, so
￿(t) < 0 for all t > 0. Given that L￿ is increasing in p, which is certainly
the case if ￿ ￿ 1, then L￿￿ ￿ 1 in the weak market for all p 2 [p￿
w;p] if
L(p)￿w(p)￿w ￿ 1, and L￿￿ ￿ 1 in the strong market too because L￿ ￿ 1 for
all p 2 [p;p￿
s]: It follows that W 0(t) < 0 for all t, and discrimination is there-
fore bad for welfare. By the same argument the opposite is true if ￿w ￿ ￿s
and L￿￿ ￿ 1 in both markets.
4. Proof of Proposition 6.











where the right-hand side is the weighted average of the inverse discrimina-
tory price in market i and the inverse non-discriminatory price. As m ranges





















as total output at prices ￿i(m): Since ￿ > 1 ~ Q(m) is the sum of strictly










































= 0 by the pro￿t-maximizing ￿rst-order condition for p:
Because ~ Q0(0) = 0 and ~ Q(m) is strictly convex it follows that ~ Q(1) > ~ Q(0),
so output increases with discrimination.
(ii) We now show that welfare falls if ￿w ￿ ￿s ￿ 1. De￿ne welfare ~ W(m)












































2[Li(￿i)(￿i ￿ 1) ￿ 1]
< 0 if ￿w ￿ 1 ￿
1
Lw(p)
= sw￿w + (1 ￿ sw)￿s; (11)
where sw ￿
qw(p)
Q(p) is the weak market￿ s share of total output at the non-
discriminatory price. Condition (11) ensures that Li(￿i)(1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ 1 for all
19￿i because Ls ￿ 1=￿s always and Lw is increasing in pw: Condition (11) is
equivalent to
(￿w ￿ ￿s)(1 ￿ sw) ￿ 1;
a condition certainly met if elasticities are not more than one apart. With
~ W 0(0) = 0 and ~ W 0(m) decreasing in m, ~ W(0) > ~ W(1), so welfare is reduced
by discrimination when (11) holds.
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